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In situations of declining or depleted fish stocks, 
fishers seem to have fallen prey to the "tragedy of the 
commons". This occurs because fishers face the dilemma 
that, although they understand that limiting their catches 
would pay off in the form of sustainable future catches, 
they can never be sure that the catch which they have 
just sacrificed will not be immediately snapped up by 
competing fishers. Standard economic theory predicts 
that, in such dilemmas, individuals are not willing to 
cooperate and sacrifice catches in the short term, and that, 
consequently, the resource is overharvested. However, 
over past decades, a multitude of research endeavours 
have shown that humans often achieve outcomes that 
are "better than rational" by building conditions where 
reciprocity, reputation, and trust help to overcome the 
temptations of short-term self-interest (Kraak, 2011). 
The biological roots of this cooperative behaviour are 
gradually being understood (Sigmund, 2010). Studies 
have provided insight into why and how a natural 
human tendency to cooperate under certain conditions 
could have evolved and become hard-wired; the 
evolutionary roots of human altruism are evident from 
the fact that chimpanzees display similar behaviour. 
The hard-wiring itself, namely the physiological basis of 
trust and cooperation, is being unravelled, giving birth 
to the discipline of neuroeconomics (Zak, 2008); the 
hormone oxytocin appears to play a role, and neural 
correlates in the brain have been uncovered. Moreover, a 
genetic polymorphism has been found to correlate with 
individual variation in levels of trust, cooperation, and 
generosity. Human nature turns out to be self-interested 
and altruistic! Fishery management could utilize this 
potential for spontaneous responsible fisher behaviour 
by setting conditions that enhance natural cooperative 
tendencies. 
Elinor Ostrom, 2009 winner of the Nobel Prize in 
Economic Sciences, has replaced the grim and gloomy 
predictions of humans being stuck within the tragedy of 
the commons with a more optimistic picture. Decades of 
field research have shown that individuals systematically 
engage in collective action, for example, to increase 
the likelihood of sustaining natural resources, without 
an external authority to offer inducements or impose 
sanctions. Ostrom (2009) provides an analysis of factors 
conducive to collective action in real-world examples.
On the negative side, the large resource size of high-
sea fisheries, the large uncertainty in knowledge of the 
state of the resource, and the mobility of fish are all non-
conducive to pro-social collective action; unfortunately, 
these variables are not under our control. On the positive 
side, when users share a common knowledge of the 
system and of how their actions affect each other, have full 
autonomy at the collective-choice level in order to devise 
and enforce some of their own rules, and depend on the 
resource for a substantial portion of their livelihoods, 
pro-social collective action is more likely.
Recently, it has become apparent that central 
intervention from authorities often directly undermines 
existing willingness to cooperate and obey the rules, 
and diminishes any stewardship motives (Bowles, 2008; 
Richter and van Soest, 2011). Policies based on the 
assumption that humans can only be lifted out of the 
economic trap through externally imposed sanctions 
have been subject to major failure and have exacerbated 
the very problems they were intended to ameliorate. 
They remove the possibility of people signalling their 
good behaviour to their social peers. Economic sanctions 
     Nobel Prize laureate Elinor Ostrom has lamented “Many policies 
based on the assumption that externally imposed sanctions are necessary 
have exacerbated the very problems they were intended to ameliorate”.
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may also make people feel that they can "buy the right" 
to be non-cooperative by paying a fine or fee; in this way, 
they buy the right to overexploit the common resource. 
Similarly, the market for carbon-emission permits might 
be perceived as trading the rights to pollute the world. 
Also, too much monitoring may produce the counter-
intuitive result that individuals feel they are not trusted 
and thus become less trustworthy. They may assume that 
formal organizations are charged with the responsibility 
of taking care of their joint needs and that cooperation 
is no longer needed. Importantly, whereas economic 
incentives, such as fines, tend to diminish any existing 
social capital when they are imposed externally, the 
opposite seems to be the case when they are imposed from 
within, by peers. Translated into the fishery-management 
context, this would imply that, even if managers believe 
it is desirable to keep institutional sanctioning, it may be 
important to involve the stakeholders in decision-making, 
for example, on the level of sanctioning. Alternatively, 
the stakeholders themselves could institutionalize 
financial sanctions from within through their producer 
organizations. 
These ideas resonate well with the intentions of the 
European Union as reflected in the Green Paper on 
Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2009). According to this 
Green Paper, the general framework for fishery policy 
would be set on the basis of a Commission proposal, 
but detailed implementation decisions could be taken 
at a regional level through a process of stakeholder 
interaction.
This reflects the recognition that a fishing industry 
cannot be managed effectively without the cooperation 
and participation of fishers in the formulation of policy 
and in the implementation and enforcement of laws and 
regulations. 
The conclusion from Kraak (2011) and Bowles (2008) 
is that small differences in institutional design may 
lead to very different outcomes in terms of cooperative 
fisher behaviour to overcome the tragedy of the 
commons. Human nature displays both self-interest 
and altruism, depending on external conditions, which 
can be manipulated. Thus, self-interested cynical people 
may become responsible moral agents under the right 
conditions. Settings that enhance these desirable 
outcomes include (i) non-anonymity – fishers’  individual 
choices should be publicly known among them and/or 
within their wider social community; (ii) provision of 
knowledge to fishers on the state of the resource and on 
the urgency and impact of their responsible behaviour; 
(iii) fishers’ self-decision on rules and (levels of) economic 
sanctions; and (iv) face-to-face communication among 
fishers and between fishers, managers, and other 
stakeholders.
One dogma that may have to be abolished is that fisheries 
data at the individual vessel level are often strictly 
confidential. This suggestion follows from the findings 
that, in order to maintain high levels of cooperation, it 
appears to be important to use the opportunity to acquire 
information on each other’s contributions, because this 
is required for reputation-building and for the (social) 
rewarding or punishing of each other’s behaviour. In 
the current situation, where individual vessel-based 
fisheries data are confidential, one such opportunity for 
monitoring each other’s level of pro-social behaviour is 
absent.
One dogma that may have to be abolished 
is that fisheries data at the individual 
vessel level are often strictly confidential.
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Let the games begin!
The public goods game is an experimental model 
commonly used to study social dilemmas. For example, €5 
is given to each of four people, who are given the option 
of investing some or all of their endowment in a group 
project by contributing, without discussion, any amount 
between €0 and €5 into the public pool. The contributions 
are collected, and the total amount is then doubled and 
divided equally among the players, irrespective of their 
contribution. If each of the four players contributed €1, 
each of them would receive €2 (i.e. a net gain of €1). If 
only three of the four players contributed €1, each of the 
three contributors would have a net gain of €0.50, but the 
defector would have a net gain of €1.50.
 
The prediction from standard rational economic theory is 
that no one will ever contribute anything because each €1 
contributed yields a return of only €0.50 to its contributor 
(corresponding to a relative loss of €0.50), no matter what 
the others do. This is a public goods problem because the 
group would be best off (i.e. taking home €10 each) if 
each member contributed €5. However, individual short-
term self-interest is at odds with long-term interest. In 
these experimental settings, people usually cooperate 
more than is predicted by standard economic theory; 
nevertheless, observed cooperation is heterogeneous, 
declines quickly over time, and is often suboptimal.
Translating the public goods game into a fishery-
management setting
 
In a previous article (Kraak, 2011), I used thought 
experiments to consider how this model could be 
translated into a fishery-management context. Imagine 
that four fishers each have a catch quota of five fish. They 
are told (analogous with the above) that each of them 
can invest in the rebuilding of the fish stock by refraining 
from catching between 0 and 5 fish. The total number of 
spared fish will be doubled and then divided among the 
group.
 
In a fishery-management context, it may be more realistic 
to consider units other than individual fish, such as tonnes 
of fish, proportion of individual quota share, or allocated 
effort. In the experimental setting, the experimenter has 
an apparently unlimited amount of money available with 
which to artificially double the amount contributed to the 
common pool. In reality, it would be impossible to double 
the amount of fish in the common pool. Fortunately, 
however, fish multiply naturally!
  
Fish that are left in the pool for any length of time will 
increase in biomass by the amount of growth minus the 
natural mortality over that period. Indeed, the dilemma 
of reducing fishing intensity to the level of maximum 
sustainable yield demands that fishers forego some yield 
in the short term while gaining yield in the long term. 
 
For example, the weight of a typical catch of cod from 
the Irish Sea will increase by a factor of 1.4 if the stock 
is left alone for one year. Furthermore, because large fish 
command a better price than small fish, the cod will also 
have increased in value by a factor of 1.6. Let us call this 
factor W (for "wait") and assign it a value of 1.5.
 
According to the rules of the game, each of the four fishers 
makes an individual decision to postpone using a portion 
of his quota entitlement until, for example, the next year. 
The next year, the total amount of catch sacrificed by all of 
the fishers, multiplied by W, and divided by the number 
of fishers in the group will be added to each fisher’s basic 
quota entitlement for that year. Assuming that W is 1.5, if 
each of the four fishers sacrifices catch this year valued 
at €1000, they would each be allowed to add catch valued 
at €1500 to their quotas (i.e. a net gain of €500 each) next 
year. If only one fisher sacrifices this year’s catch (value 
   Athenian statesman and lawmaker Solon (ca. 638–558 BC). 
In drawing up his laws, Solon was ridiculed for supposing that his 
countrymen’s greed could be kept within bounds by means of laws. He 
replied that he was framing his laws in such a way as to make it clear 
that it would be to everybody’s advantage to keep the laws rather than 
to break them.
of €1000), each of the four fishers would be allowed to 
add catch valued at €375 to his/her quota next year; the 
cooperative fisher would, therefore, suffer a net loss of 
€625, whereas the defectors would each enjoy a net gain 
of €375. Note that when the TAC and the quota for the 
next year are being calculated through standard stock-
assessment procedures, an assumption is being made 
about the current year’s total catch; our calculations 
above are valid providing that any catch sacrificed is not 
added (“returned”) to the modelled stock size.
  
The calculations above ignore the economic 
phenomenon of discounting, which arises from the 
rational preference to receive benefits today rather than 
postponing them until tomorrow: €100 today has a greater 
value than €100 next year, which is why borrowed money 
has to be paid back with interest. Great uncertainty 
about the future results in a high discount rate, and this 
constitutes one of the fundamental problems in resource 
management. In our calculations, we could reduce the 
gain with a factor representing the discount rate – as 
long as its inverse is (much) smaller than W. With a 
discounting factor of 0.9 year−1 and W equalling 1.5, the 
perceived gain that drives the cooperation would be +0.35. 
Another aspect fundamental to making the fishing game 
more realistic is group size. The experimental setting of 
four people in a group is very artificial. National quotas 
are usually distributed to several hundred fishers. 
Whereas in the example with four players, a player who 
contributes €1 would lose only €0.50 if the three other 
players defect; he/she would lose €0.99 (almost all of 
the €1 contribution) if all of the others in a group of 200 
players defected. The gains if all players cooperate do 
not depend on group size; they are always double the 
total starting amount. Thus, the rationality of cooperation 
decreases with group size. 
In any case, in the restrictive settings of the model 
described by the basic public goods game, not a great 
deal of cooperative behaviour can be expected because 
the fishers are caught in the tragedy of the commons. 
Thankfully, humans do not always make decisions based 
on what is economically rational.
 
 
Exploring the game when reputation matters
 
Theorists have demonstrated that cooperation can 
evolve through indirect reciprocity. This refers to the 
phenomenon that individuals who help others are given 
support, and that supporters as well as helpers accrue a 
positive reputation or image score. Experimental studies 
have confirmed that human subjects preferentially help 
others who have a positive image score.
 
Milinski et al. (2002a) measured the increase in 
cooperation under indirect reciprocity. In their 
experiment, participants played a version of the public 
goods game with an added dimension that they called 
the "indirect reciprocity game". This game assigns some 
participants to the role of donor and others to the role of 
recipient in a public situation where no direct reciprocity 
is possible. Donors have the option of donating a sum to 
an assigned recipient who will never be able to reciprocate 
this gesture. The sum received will be greater than the 
sum donated by an arbitrary factor; in this experiment, 
the donors "paid" 2.5 and the recipients "received" 4. 
Experimental studies have confirmed that 
human subjects preferentially help others 
who have a positive image score.
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Rounds of both games were played alternately, decisions 
were made confidentially, and after each round, the 
outcomes were displayed publicly.
Milinski and his colleagues found that cooperation (and 
consequently average individual pay-off) in the public 
goods games increased significantly when they were 
alternated with the indirect reciprocity games. Over eight 
rounds, the probability of cooperation in purely public 
goods games fell from 84 to 45 per cent, but it remained 
around or above 84 per cent when these games were 
alternated with indirect reciprocity games, in which case 
the average individual pay-off was 1.45-fold higher.
 
Translation of the game when reputation matters into 
fishery-management settings
 
The outcome of the above experiment indicates that (i) 
people are more inclined to contribute to the common 
pool if their reputation is at stake, and (ii) people reward 
each other for generosity. If we imagine this game being 
used as a management tool in a hypothetical fishing 
community where players are not anonymous, it is 
expected that generous contributors will receive benefits 
in their local communities throughout the year, while 
defectors may become social outcasts. It is precisely this 
expectation, of receiving favours vs. becoming a social 
outcast (whether partly or wholly unconscious), that 
operates as an incentive to contribute more generously. 
However, if only one round of the public goods game is 
played per year in this hypothetical fishing community 
(naturally interspersed by the rest of the year, during 
which indirect reciprocity takes place), an individual 
will not be allowed quick adjustment of the level 
of cooperation in response to feedback about their 
reputation and generosity. Perhaps multiple rounds per 
year would have to be played. 
Moreover, in a real-world situation, this may only work if 
a fishery is harvested by fishers in a relatively small local 
community, where all fishers know each other personally 
and interact extensively year-round, i.e. where reputation 
is important. An important prerequisite if this system is 
to work may be the publication of the outcomes of the 
public goods game, with participants’ full names, for 
example, in the local newspaper.
In a similar experiment that tested the effect of reputation 
and indirect reciprocity (Milinski et al., 2002b), it was 
found that, when people donated publicly to a well-
known charity, they themselves received increased 
donations from members of their peer group. Thus, people 
are rewarded for generosity not only towards fellow 
players, or towards a common pool of direct interest to 
the players, but also towards a charity from which only 
third parties benefit. This has important implications, as 
explained in the following experiment.
When the public good game really is for the public 
good
 
In another experiment, Milinski et al. (2006) demonstrated 
that if, in contrast to the standard protocol (where the 
common pool is divided among the participants), it is 
promised that the pool will be invested to encourage 
people in the society at large to reduce their fossil fuel 
use (through an advertisement in a national newspaper), 
players can behave altruistically. The experimenters 
found that the basic level of unselfish behaviour was 
enhanced if the players were provided with expert 
information describing the state of knowledge in 
climate research. Analogous to the previous experiment, 
personal investments in climate-change prevention 
increased substantially if social reputation was at stake. 
Translation of the public good game into fishery-
management settings when it really is for the public 
good
  
The discovery that individuals are willing to invest in a 
public good that conveys an uncertain benefit, which is 
diluted among the whole of society, is an important one 
for our case. It implies that fishers may be cooperative 
not only if their sacrificed quota is given back to them 
multiplied by W at a later stage, but also if the only gain 
to the individual fisher is the possibility of a rebuilt or 
One could envisage establishing a mixture 
of rewarding fishers with some extra 
quota for next year combined with the 
more abstract reward of stock growth.
increased stock. This is important, because, if this were 
not the case, the stock would not necessarily benefit 
from such cooperation; after all, fish that were not taken 
out today would be taken out tomorrow (or rather next 
year). However, if fishers, under the right conditions, can 
experience an incentive to invest in the rebuilding of the 
stock itself – a public good that is shared by all people, not 
just by their group of players – this can be used in fishery 
management. In this scenario, fishers would be willing 
to sacrifice catches for the sake of stock increase, from 
which they themselves and everybody else may benefit 
in an undetermined future and by an undetermined and 
uncertain amount.
As an illustration, the recommended TAC for the Celtic 
Sea cod stock (ICES Divisions VIIe–k) in 2009 was 2600 
tonnes, which was predicted to bring the spawning-
stock biomass in 2010 to 8800 tonnes (ICES, 2008). If 10 
per cent of that TAC (i.e. 260 tonnes) had been sacrificed, 
those fish, allowing for growth and natural mortality, 
would have increased in biomass by a factor W = 1.4 to 
364 tonnes, resulting in an increase in predicted stock 
biomass of 4 per cent. Alternatively, if the 10 per cent had 
not been sacrificed but only postponed for one year, then 
the 260 tonnes would have been added to the TAC for the 
next year, and a net gain of only 104 tonnes would have 
been added to the stock biomass. This would mean that 
there had only been a 1 per cent increase in the predicted 
stock biomass.
 
One could envisage establishing a mixture of rewarding 
fishers with some extra quota for next year combined 
with the more abstract reward of stock growth. The 
fishers’ incentive to postpone some of this year’s catch 
would then be partly a "direct" gain (a known increase 
in quota, albeit postponed to next year) and partly an 
"indirect" gain through stock growth. The net gain of 104 
tonnes could, for example, be split between extra quota 
and stock growth at a ratio of 1 to 9; in this case, fishers 
would experience a quota increase of 4 per cent and 
the predicted stock biomass would still benefit from a 1 
per cent increase. Note that even a 1 per cent benefit is 
probably more than the reduction in society’s fossil fuel 
use that could be expected to result from a newspaper 
advertisement, as in the experiment by Milinski et al. 
(2006).
  
Nevertheless, the future states of both fish stocks and 
catches are notoriously difficult to predict, and such 
uncertainty results in a high perceived discount rate. One 
of the (many) reasons fishers do not favour conservation 
plans, despite their apparent long-term benefits, is that 
stock–catch predictions are often wrong. Consequently, 
even if it is predicted that, by taking less today, all 
fishers will benefit tomorrow, fishers know this will not 
necessarily happen.
 Another interesting result of the experiment by Milinski 
et al. (2006) is that altruistic behaviour was enhanced 
if the players were provided with expert information 
describing the state of knowledge in climate research. 
For our purpose, this suggests that it may be important 
to inform fishers of their expected gains from projected 
stock growth. 
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